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We analyzed attack rates for severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) in three categories of hospital workers
(nurses, nonmedical support staff, and other technical or
medical staff) in all public hospitals in Hong Kong that had
admitted SARS patients. Of 16 such hospitals, 14 had
cases. The overall attack rate was 1.20%. Nonmedical sup-
port staff had the highest attack rate (2.73%). The odds
ratios of group nonmedical support staff versus those of
nurses and of nonmedical support staff versus other tech-
nical or medical staff were 2.30 (p < 0.001) and 9.78 (p <
0.001), respectively. The number of affected staff and
attack rates were significantly correlated with the number of
SARS patients admitted (r = 0.914 and 0.686, respective-
ly). Affected patients were concentrated in three hospitals
and in the earlier phase of the epidemic. Cleaning and cler-
ical staff on hospital wards were at a much higher risk. 
T
he global epidemic of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) occurred in Hong Kong, mainland
China, and other countries from March to June in 2003.
The cases in Hong Kong and mainland China accounted
for 84.1% of all cases worldwide (1,755 and 5,327, respec-
tively); the number of deaths accounted for 70.9% of all
SARS-related deaths worldwide (298 and 348, respective-
ly) (1). The first major outbreak in Hong Kong occurred in
the Prince of Wales Hospital around March 10, 2003. It
resulted in 138 SARS patients, 69% of whom were hospi-
tal workers (2). In Hong Kong, 360 hospital workers con-
tracted SARS, a figure that represented 20.5% of all
case-patients on the island (3). A study reported that 40
hospital workers in a community hospital in Hong Kong
were affected during a 6-week period (March 25–May 5,
2003); the attack rates were 6.1, 10.2, 8.8, 2.0, 0.0, and 0.0
per 1,000, respectively, in these 6 weeks (4). 
In Canada, the first large SARS outbreak also occurred
in a community hospital, affecting 128 patients (36.7% of
all hospital staff). The attack rates among nurses ranged
from 10.3% to 60.0%, depending on which department
they were serving (5). In mainland China, nosocomial
infections played an important role in the SARS outbreak,
especially in the first phase of the epidemic (6–8).
Nosocomial infection was the most important cause of the
SARS outbreak in the Haidian district, Beijing (7).
Hospital workers were therefore at high risk of contracting
SARS. Improved hospital infection control likely con-
tributed substantially to the control of the SARS epidemic
in Hong Kong (9). 
Acase-control study of 72 hospital workers with SARS
and 144 matched controls found that inconsistent use of
goggles, gowns, gloves, and caps (unadjusted odds ratio
[OR] = 2.42–20.54, p < 0.05), as well as perceived inade-
quate training and perceived inadequate supply of protec-
tive equipment were significantly associated with higher
risk for nosocomial infection (10). Another study in China
showed that good ventilation, isolation of SARS patients,
and use of personal protection equipment were key means
of preventing healthcare workers from becoming infected
(11).
Because a substantial number of hospital workers con-
tracted SARS in Hong Kong and in other places, docu-
menting the attack rate in different hospitals in Hong Kong
was warranted. Such information would reflect the degree
of exposure to relevant occupational hazards among differ-
ent types of hospital workers in Hong Kong.
This study gives an account of the attack rates of work-
ers in all public hospitals in Hong Kong that had admitted
SARS patients. The attack rates of three categories of hos-
pital workers, as well as relevant attack rates in the earlier
and later phases of the epidemic, were compared. The
attack rates were also correlated with the number of SARS
patients admitted to the individual hospitals. 
Methods
For all hospitals that had admitted SARS patients in
Hong Kong, the numbers of probable SARS patients and
of hospital staff in three job categories were obtained.
These three categories included nurses (group N),
nonmedical support staff (group S; healthcare assistants,
ward assistants [cleaning staff], general service assistant
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*The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China [clerical staff]), and other medical or technical staff (group
O; physicians, allied health workers, technicians, pharma-
cists, dieticians, radiologists, radiographers, and medical
students, and the like). All were full-time staff. The
Hospital Authority and individual hospitals kept lists of
infected workers who were hospital staff members. These
lists were provided to the authors, with data already
grouped into the three categories and the two time periods;
no further breakdown of the data was available. Most data
were obtained from the Hospital Authority; supplementary
data were obtained from a few hospitals. The number of
these three types of workers who became probable SARS
patients, according to the World Health Organization defi-
nition (1), was recorded. These figures were further strati-
fied into two groups: patients whose onset of symptoms
occurred 1) before April 17, or 2) on or after April 17,
which was approximately the mid-point of the epidemic.
(The first patient was admitted on March 4, 2003, and the
onset of the last case was on May 31, 2003). Attack rates
for the three categories of hospital workers were obtained
by dividing the relevant number of hospital care workers
contracting SARS by the total number of relevant staff
members.
Chi-square test and Fisher exact test were used to test
the significance of differences in proportions. Spearman
correlation analysis was performed to examine the associ-
ation between the number of SARS patients admitted into
a hospital and the number of healthcare workers who con-
tracted SARS in the same hospital. Analysis of variance
(ANOVA) and Kruskal-Wallis test were used to compare
differences in attack rates among the three types of work-
ers. SPSS for Windows Release 11.0.1 (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL) was used for the data analysis; p < 0.05 was
considered to be significant. Differences in attack rates
among the 16 hospitals were tested by using Fisher-
Freeman-Halton test (StatXact-4 version 4.0.1, Cytel
Software Corporation, Cambridge, MA). 
Results
Infected Staff and Attack Rates
A total of 1,755 SARS patients were reported in Hong
Kong; they were hospitalized in 16 of the 27 hospitals gov-
erned by the Hospital Authority. Fourteen of these 16 hos-
pitals had at least one hospital staff member who
contracted SARS. In other words, 2 of the 16 hospitals
(hospital 2 and hospital 4, which admitted 7 and 17 SARS
patients, respectively) had a zero attack rate (Table 1).
The total number of affected hospital workers in these
16 hospitals was 339 (i.e., 94.2% of all 360 affected hospi-
tal workers in Hong Kong). The other 21 (5.8%) affected
hospital staff worked in six other hospitals that had not
admitted SARS patients. The distribution of the 339 cases
is analyzed in this article.
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Table 1. Number of hospital workers, SARS affected hospital workers, and SARS patients admitted to hospitals and attack rates  
No. of hospital staff who contracted SARS   Attack rates (%)   Hospital 
no.
a 
No. of SARS 
patients 
admitted to 
hospitals  Group N  Group S  Group O  Overall
a  Group N  Group S  Group O  Overall
b 
1  3  0  0  2  2  0.00  0.00  0.73  0.18 
2  7  0  0  0  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
3  17  6  2  0  8  1.19  0.96  0.00  0.79 
4  17  0  0  0  0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
5  24  1  3  0  4  0.33  1.29  0.00  0.64 
6  29  7  3  1  11  0.95  0.83  0.23  0.71 
7  36  2  0  0  2  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.07 
8  53  1  2  1  4  0.26  1.80  0.41  0.54 
9  82  5  5  1  11  0.42  1.11  0.18  0.50 
10  83  8  6  0  14  0.51  1.15  0.00  0.48 
11  85  6  6  1  13  0.47  1.41  0.14  0.54 
12  114  18  14  4  36  3.58  6.93  1.37  3.61 
13  128  15  7  0  22  0.87  1.42  0.00  0.68 
14  188  13  14  2  29  1.01  3.36  0.26  1.17 
15  326  64  54  2  120  4.66  13.30  0.21  4.38 
16  563  35  18  10  63  2.76  3.92  1.53  2.64 
Pooled  1,755  181  134  24  339  1.21  2.73  0.29  1.20 
p value            < 0.001
c  < 0.001
c  < 0.001
d  < 0.001
c 
Spearman 
correlation 
coefficients 
  0.883***  0.928***  0.525*  0.914*  0.737*  0.865***  0.390  0.686** 
aAll hospital workers, including all three groups (group N, nurses; group S, nonmedical support staff; and group O, other  technical and medical staff).  
bAll hospitals that had at least admitted one SARS patient.  
cp values derived from Pearson Chi-square test and comparing the attack rates among all the 16 hospitals.  
dp values derived from Fisher -Freeman-Halton test and compa ring the attack rates among all the 16 hospitals: *, p < 0.05; **, p  < 0.01; and ***, p  < 0.001.  The number of affected staff in 2 hospitals (hospitals 15
and 16) accounted for 54.0% of the 339 cases in the 16
Health Authority hospitals (Table 1). The number of affect-
ed staff in an individual hospital ranged from 0 to 120
(median = 11, interquartile range = 24.8) (Table 1). The
overall attack rates for all three types of hospital staff was
1.20% for the 16 hospitals. These rates ranged from 0% to
4.38%, a significant variation (p < 0.001, Table 1). The
overall mean and median of the 16 hospital attack rates for
all workers were 1.06% and 0.59%, respectively (Table 2).
The overall attack rates for all workers were >2% in three
hospitals (hospitals 12, 15, and 16; Table 1). When these
three hospitals were removed from the analysis, the over-
all attack rate was 0.54% and the mean and median of the
13 hospital attack rates were 0.48% and 0.54%, respective-
ly (data not shown in table).
Attack Rates by Category of Hospital Worker
Attack rates in the three job category groups (group N,
S, and O) of hospital workers are listed in Table 1. The
ranges of attack rates for the three groups were 0%–4.66%
(group N), 0.0%–13.3% (group S), and 0.0%–1.53%
(group O). The pooled attack rates for these three groups
were 1.21%, 2.73%, and 0.29%, respectively, in the 16
hospitals (Table 1). ORs for comparing the S and N, O and
N, and S and O groups were 2.30 (p < 0.001), 0.24 (p <
0.001), and 9.78 (p < 0.001), respectively. The differences
in both the mean and median attack rates for the three cat-
egories were also significant (p = 0.035, ANOVA test, and
p = 0.015 and p = 0.015, Kruskal-Wallis test) (Table 2).
Associations between Numbers of SARS Patients
Admitted and Hospital Attack Rates 
The number of affected staff was strongly correlated
with the number of admitted SARS patients for all the
three groups: group N (Spearman r = 0.883, p < 0.001),
group S (Spearman r = 0.928, p < 0.001), and group O
(Spearman r = 0.525, p <0.05) (Table 1). Similar signifi-
cant associations between attack rates and number of
admitted SARS patients were observed for groups N and S
but not for group O (Spearman r = 0.737, 0.865, and 0.39,
respectively) (Table 1). 
Comparison of Attack Rates in First Two 
Phases of Epidemic 
The overall attack rates for all hospital workers in the
first phase of the epidemic (before April 17, 2003: 0.98%)
were higher than those for the second phrase (on or after
April 17, 2003: 0.22%) (Table 3). This finding was true for
all three groups of workers (group N: 0.99% vs. 0.22%;
group S: 2.24% vs. 0.50%; group O: 0.21% vs. 0.07%).
When data from individual hospitals were examined, how-
ever, the trend was not always consistent. 
Discussion
The overall attack rate for all workers in the 16 hospi-
tals was 1.2%. Staff members working in 14 hospitals con-
tracted SARS, although the attack rates varied
significantly among hospitals. The attack rate was >2% in
three hospitals, which had 219 (60.8%) of the total 360
cases in Hong Kong. Compared to the overall attack rate
(1.2%), the attack rate was much lower (0.54%) for the
other 13 hospitals; the pooled overall attack rate for the 16
hospitals was also much lower (0.47%) in the second
phase of the epidemic. In other words, nosocomial infec-
tion of hospital workers in Hong Kong was concentrated in
three hospitals and in the earliest phase of the epidemic
(the overall attack rates in the earlier phase were 2.18%,
3.37%, and 3.81% for these three hospitals).
Attack rates were also associated with the number of
SARS patients admitted into the individual hospitals. Five
of the 16 hospitals admitted >100 patients. In terms of
number of affected workers and attack rates, these five
hospitals were also the top five of the 16 studied hospitals
(except for hospital 13, which ranked seventh in terms of
attack rates). Theoretically, viral load, inadequate man-
power, inadequate equipment, and inadequate time for
training were possible explanations for the observed asso-
ciations. If the SARS epidemic resurges on a sizable scale,
some consideration should be given to the number of
patients to be admitted to a hospital. Yet, without further
data, the exact reasons were not clear. 
The attack rates also differed significantly among the
three studied occupational groups. Support staff, such as
healthcare assistants, cleaners, and clerical staff working
on the wards (group S), had much higher attack rates,
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Table 2. Mean and median attack rates of the 16 hospitals by job categories  
  Mean of attack rates (%)   SD  Median of attack rates (%)   Interquartertile range   Range 
Group N  1.07  1.38  0.49  0.99  0.00–4.66 
Group S  2.34  3.43  1.22  2.76  0.00–13.30 
Group O  0.32  0.49  0.16  0.37  0.00–1.53 
Overall
a  1.06  1.31  0.59  0.82  0.00–4.38 
p value  0.035
b    0.015
c     
aOverall: all the hospital workers, including all three groups (group N, nurses; group S, nonmedical support staff; group O, other technical and medical staff)  
bp values for testing differences among group N, S, and O (ANOVA).  
cp values for testing differences among group N, S, and O (Kruskal-Wallis test).   
 when compared to nurses (group N) and other categories
of hospital workers, including physicians (group O). The
attack rate of nonmedical support staff (group S) was high-
er than those of the other two groups in 10 of the 16 stud-
ied hospitals. Nonmedical support staff accounted for 134
(39.5%) of the 339 SARS patients among hospital work-
ers, despite the fact that only approximately 17.3% of all
Hospital Authority staff belonged to this group.
Furthermore, 12 of the 16 hospitals had cases in nonmed-
ical support staff (attack rate 0.83%–13.3% [mean
2.34%]). Even when the later phase of the epidemic was
considered, the attack rates of nonmedical support staff
were still relatively high (Table 3). Three of the six
Hospital Authority staff who died of SARS also belonged
to this group. In short, nonmedically trained support staff
were exposed to a disproportionately high risk for nosoco-
mial transmission of SARS. Apparently, infection control
training was also offered to this group. However, the exact
amount of training or assessment of how well the training
was understood by this group was not documented.
Extra protection is required to protect this staff group in
the infection control campaign in Hong Kong. Insufficient
emphasis may have been given to address the special needs
of this group during the first SARS epidemic in Hong
Kong, as well as during the post-SARS period. Infection
control training and policies may need to be tailored for
different occupational groups.
Nonmedical support staff, in general, were not contact-
ing SARS patients as frequently as nurses did. This finding
suggests that the fomite theory and the aerosol theory of
transmission could not be dismissed. Another study inves-
tigating nosocomial infection in Hong Kong (10) reported
that breakthrough transmission was likely responsible for
nosocomial infection of hospital workers. Inconsistent use
of personal protection equipment, perceived inadequate
supply of such equipment, inadequate training, and per-
ceived lack of knowledge about infection control were all
statistically significant predictors of such breakthrough
transmissions.
Nonmedical support staff may have been more likely
to be lacking infection control knowledge, either as a
result of receiving inadequate training or being unable to
benefit fully from it. Whether they were adequately
trained to use their personal protective equipment correct-
ly is not clear. For instance, some preliminary studies
mentioned that some workers were wearing or taking off
such equipment in the wrong sequence (Lau et al., unpub.
data). In Hong Kong, many support staff were likely to be
middle-aged persons, who had a relatively low level of
education (many of them did not finish secondary
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Table 3. Attack rate among hospitals by job categories and time period   
Group N  Group S  Group O  Overall
a 
Hospital no. 
Onset before 
7/4 (%) 
Onset after 
7/4 (%) 
Onset before 
7/4 (%) 
Onset after 
7/4 (%) 
Onset before 
7/4 (%) 
Onset after 
7/4 (%) 
Onset before 
7/4 (%) 
Onset after 
7/4 (%) 
1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.36  0.36  0.09  0.09 
2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
3  0.40  0.80  0.00  0.96  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.60 
4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
5  0.00  0.33  0.43  0.86  0.00  0.00  0.16  0.48 
6  0.00  0.95  0.28  0.55  0.23  0.00  0.13  0.58 
7  0.00  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07 
8  0.26  0.00  0.90  0.91  0.41  0.00  0.40  0.14 
9  0.42  0.00  1.11  0.00  0.18  0.00  0.50  0.00 
10  0.26  0.26  0.19  0.96  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.31 
11  0.47  0.00  1.41  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.54  0.00 
12  3.38  0.21  6.44  0.53  1.02  0.34  3.31  0.31 
13  0.87  0.00  1.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.68  0.00 
14  1.01  0.00  2.88  0.49  0.13  0.13  1.05  0.12 
15  4.08  0.61  11.82  1.68  0.21  0.00  3.87  0.53 
16  2.36  0.40  3.27  0.68  1.07  0.46  2.18  0.47 
Pooled  
(16 hospitals) 
0.99  0.22  2.24  0.50  0.21  0.07  0.98  0.22 
Ratio of pooled 
rates (phase 1 
vs. 2) 
4.50:1    4.48:1    3.00:1    4.45:1   
p values 
(among 16 
hospitals) 
< 0.001
b  < 0.001
c  < 0.001
c  0.036
c  0.002
c   0.048
c  < 0.001
b  < 0.001
c 
aOverall: all the hospital workers, including all three groups (N, S, and O).    
bPearson Chi-square test.  
cFisher-Freeman-Halton test. 
 schools). Tailored infection control training and surveil-
lance programs are hence warranted to ensure that this
group of workers is sufficiently protected from the occu-
pational hazard of contracting SARS. Practice exercises
may also be an effective preventive measure.
These findings do not mean that nurses were not under
a high level of occupational hazard. More than 50% of the
affected workers were nurses. In six hospitals, nurses’
attack rates were close to or higher than 1%; the maximum
was 4.66%. The correlations between number of SARS
patients admitted and the number of affected workers were
much stronger in the nonmedical support and nursing
groups, when compared with that of other medical staff).
This finding is understandable as most members of these
two groups were working on the frontlines.
Most affected staff (94.2%) were working in hospitals
that had been taking care of SARS patients. Further trans-
mission through social contacts had not been a major fac-
tor of transmission among hospital workers (10).
Nosocomial infection was therefore likely to be responsi-
ble for most transmission. Hospital workers in Hong Kong
were well supported and appreciated by Hong Kong citi-
zens and the mass media for their professionalism in treat-
ing SARS patients. Whether such strong media interest in
their experiences and commitment influenced hospital
workers in their decision to serve in high-risk environ-
ments, at times even when protection might not have been
adequate, is of interest. Questions such as how conformity
and peer pressure affected the decisions of individual
workers who felt that they had to work under suboptimal
infection control conditions are worth exploring.
The pooled attack rates (for 16 hospitals) were 0.22,
0.50, and 0.07, respectively, for nurses, nonmedical sup-
port, and other medical and technical staff when only cases
of later onset (on or after April 17, 2003) were considered.
When cases with earlier onset (before April 17, 2003) were
considered, the rates were higher: 0.99, 2.24, and 0.21,
respectively. The respective ratios of the two phases of the
epidemic were 4.50:1, 4.48:1, and 3.00:1 for the three
types of hospital workers and 4.45:1 for hospital workers
overall (Table 3). This may be due to a reduction in the
number of patients admitted after April 17 (approximately
18.3% of all cases; the number of patients admitted in the
two phases was hence 3.92:1) or to improvement of infec-
tion control measures. The overall attack rate ratio (4.45:1,
0.98%/0.22%) was very similar to the overall admission
rate for the two phases (4.46:1), although the two ratios
were not conceptually equivalent. It, however, gives a clue
that the decrease in exposure may have played a relatively
important role in the decreased attack rate in the second
phase. Improved infection control in the second phase may
not be the primary reason for the decrease in the attack rate
over time. If proper training, supply of personal protective
equipment, infection control procedures, nonexcessive
number of patients per hospital, and other measures are
ensured, nosocomial infection of hospital workers should
be avoidable. On the other hand, hospital workers, espe-
cially nonmedical support staff, should be aware that they
are facing a certain level of occupational risk. 
The study has some limitations. First, only macro-level
data were used. Since no individual data were available,
factors associated with nosocomial infection could not be
studied. Similarly, no clinical data were reported. Some
hospital workers may have been infected in the communi-
ty. However, another case-control study showed that social
contact with other infected colleagues was not a significant
factor associated with likelihood of infection among hospi-
tal workers (10). The chance of nosocomial infection was
therefore very high for these staff who contracted SARS.
Another study suggested that asymptomatic transmission
among hospital workers was not prevalent (5). Second, dif-
ferent types of workers were included in the three studied
job categories, and some heterogeneity across these differ-
ent types of workers with the categories may exist. The
available data do not permit further breakdown. The clas-
sification of affected workers into the three categories was
arbitrary and may also have affected results. Further, no
additional data exist to compare the conditions on infection
control and other measures taken within the two analyzed
phases of the epidemic, making definite interpretation
impossible. The study, however, documents one of the
most important scenarios of nosocomial infection among
hospital workers. The results should help us to learn from
this very costly lesson.
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